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CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER THE FEDERAL WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
United States v. Frezzo Brothers
602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980)
Although criminal prosecutions are authorized under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972,1 civil actions have remained the
enforcement norm. Recently, however, federal prosecutors have begun
to apply criminal remedies as a method to prompt polluters to clean
up.

2

United States v. Frezzo Brothers3 demonstrates the potential of
criminal prosecution. In Frezzo, a family owned enterprise permitted
manure-rich waters to flow into a stream. The United States Environmental Protection Agency4 had never promulgated effluent limitations 5
or other regulations applicable to the defendants' business, nor had it
issued any abatement order or other prior notice that defendants might
be in violation of the FWPCA.6 Nevertheless, the United States Attorney obtained convictions 7 and the United States Court of Appeals for
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1321 (1976 & Supp. 1977). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
of 1972 is hereinafter referred to as FWPCA.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Olin
Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F.
Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975).
See also Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1979, at 21, col. 2:
The Justice Department moved to strengthen its enforcement of laws dealing with
pollution and hazardous waste ...
[The holder of] a newly created post of Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
department's Land and Natural Resources Division. . . .will oversee a new hazardouswaste section, along with the department's existing pollution-control section [and] will
also supervise all of the division's criminal prosecutions.
Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti said that 20 lawyers will be added to the division's staff to aid enforcement efforts.
These management moves follow months of discussion within the department about
the need for tougher enforcement of environmental laws.
3. 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980).
4. The United States Environmental Protection Agency is charged with implementation of
the act. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1976). Hereinafter that agency will be referred to as the EPA.
5. Effluent limitation is defined as follows:
The term "effluent limitation" means any restriction established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and
other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1976). See EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
426 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1976); Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 567 F.2d 661, 673 (6th Cir. 1977) (Engel, J.,
dissenting); see text accompanying notes 45-50 infra.
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
7. United States v. Frezzo Bros., 461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions.8

Frezzo lays a foundation for increased federal prosecution and jail
sentences for polluters. This comment will discuss federal water pollution laws preceding the FWPCA, the enforcement scheme of the
FWPCA, and various cases illustrating its implementation. Next, the

Frezzo case will be presented and analyzed. Finally, the potential impact of the Frezzo decision upon future prosecutions will be considered.
DEVELOPMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF WATER POLLUTION
LEGISLATION

The Federal Water Pollution Act of 1948
Prior to the 1970's, federal water pollution enforcement "relied almost exclusively on negotiation, public pressure, and voluntary compliance." 9 The first federal statute intended to remedy water pollution
was the Federal Water Pollution Act of 1948.10 This act and its amendments provided for an extended "conference procedure" as a means of
enforcement.' This procedure required conferences among the dischargers of pollutants and all control agencies in the region 1 2 followed
by an informal hearing "intended to resolve pollution problems by con-3
ciliation and coordination, rather than by enforcement sanctions."'
These procedures delayed any enforcement for at least two years and
the only enforcement available then was an injunction.' 4 During the
twenty-four years of the existence of this legislation prior to passage of
the FWPCA, this procedure resulted in but one case reaching court.' 5
That case was settled by a consent decree.
8. United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W.
3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980).
9. Glenn, The Crime of 'Pollution" The Role of Federal Water Pollution Criminal Sanctions, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 835, 836 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Glenn].
10. The Federal Water Pollution Act of 1948 declared that it was the "policy of Congress to
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States in controlling
water pollution." 33 U.S.C. § 466 (1964). Thus, although this act was a first step, the Congress
had not thrown the full force of the federal government behind efforts to control water pollution.
11. See I F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2-75 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as GRAD]; S.
REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 2, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3668,
3669, where the committee report traces the major amendments to the 1948 act prior to the
FWPCA.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3668, 3672.

14. Id.
15. In that case, United States v. City of St. Joseph, Docket No. 1077 (w.D. Mo. St. Joseph
Div. 1961), the polluter was dumping over five million tons of raw sewage a day during the four
years which elapsed between the initial conference and the consent degree.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

The principal weaknesses of this act were that the government was
required to give a violator 180 days notice prior to initiating court action; the act applied only to interstate waters, which comprise only
about fourteen percent of all waters in the United States; and the act
provided for the establishment of "stream standards" for a body of
water and not effluent standards, which are prescribed for the source of
the discharge. 16
The Refuse Act
Dissatisfaction with the Federal Water Pollution Act of 1948 led to
the dusting off of an older piece of legislation which was originally
designed to prevent obstruction of navigable waters.17 This legislation,
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,18 made it illegal to discharge or
deposit "any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other
than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom...
into any navigable waters."' 9 From its inception until the late 1960's,
the so-called Refuse Act was almost exclusively used to prosecute cre20
ators of obstructions or impediments to anchorage or navigation.
However, during the 1960's, several United States Supreme Court cases
began to expand application of the Refuse Act to prohibit pollution.
In the first of these cases, United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,2t
the Court interpreted the Refuse Act as applying to the discharge of
liquid wastes containing suspended solids which had not blocked navigation or anchorage. 22 This decision was expanded by the Court in
United States v. StandardOil Co.,23 where the defendant claimed that
the gasoline he had spilled into a waterway could not come within the
scope of the Refuse Act because it was a valuable commodity. 24 The
16. Druley, The RefuseAct of 1899, 2 ENV. REP. Monograph No. 11 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Druley].
17. Id.
18. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952); United States v.
Moran, 113 F. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1901); United States v. Marthinson, 58 F. 765 (E.D.S.C. 1893) (predecessor to the Refuse Act of 1899 not directed to floating logs because they were not a permanent
obstruction); United States v. Bums, 54 F. 351 (D.W. Va. 1893) (predecessor to the Refuse Act of
1899).
Furthermore, the Army Corps of Engineers, charged with administration of the Refuse Act,
continued to emphasize the statute's application to impediments to navigation even after United
States Supreme Court decisions in the 1960's to the contrary. See text accompanying notes 21-27
infra.

21.
22.
23.
24.

362
Id.
384
Id.

U.S. 482 (1960).
at 490.
U.S. 224 (1966).
at 225.
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Court rejected this defense, stating that "[tlhis case comes to us at a
time where there is greater concern than ever over pollution--one of
25
the main threats to our free-flowing rivers and to our lakes as well."
Furthermore, StandardOil provided a foundation for the imposition of
strict liability under the Refuse Act since the Court had reinstated an
indictment charging that the defendant had merely "allowed" the gasoline to enter the waterway. 26 Consequently, civil and criminal liability
have been imposed under the Refuse Act without a showing of intent,
27
knowledge, or negligence.
While these decisions greatly expanded the potential reach of the
Refuse Act and led to significant enforcement, the Refuse Act was still
not widely utilized. In the early 1970's, however, public pressure
caused the agency charged with its administration, the Army Corps of
Engineers, to establish a permit system under the statute. 28 Further im25. Id. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, continued:
The crisis that we face in this respect would not, of course, warrant us in manufacturing
offenses where Congress had not acted nor in stretching statutory language in a criminal
field to meet strange conditions. But whatever may be said of the rule of strict construction, it cannot provide a substitute for common sense, precedent, and legislative history.
We cannot construe § 13 [33 U.S.C. § 407] of the Rivers and Harbors Act in a vacuum.
Id. at 225-26.
Lower courts also expanded their application of the Refuse Act. See, e.g., United States v.
Esso Standard Oil Co., 375 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1967) (liquid petroleum products); United States v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 354 F. Supp. 173 (N.D.W. Va. 1973) ("effluent wastes"); United States v.
Granite State Packing Co., 343 F. Supp. 57 (D.N.H.), a7'd,470 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1972) (blood,
manure, and grease); United States v. Interlake Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (iron
particles and oily substance).
26. 384 U.S. at 225. See Olds, Unkovic & Lewin, Thoughts on the Role of Penalties in the
Enforcement of the Clean Air and Water Acts, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Olds].
Although the Standard Oil Court specifically declined to reach the liability question, 384 U.S.
at 230, the facts of the case provided a basis for a strict liability interpretation. See United States
v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1974), where the court cited StandardOil in applying
strict liability in a criminal prosecution.
27. United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1974). In that case, the court
examined the standard of liability necessary for criminal prosecution under the Refuse Act. Defendant corporation operated an oil tank farm near the Boston harbor. Over a period of years, oil
had accumulated underground. This oil percolated through the soil and entered the harbor. In
explaining the policy behind strict liability, the court stated:
Merely to attempt to formulate, let alone apply [a due care defense] would be to risk
crippling the Refuse Act as an enforcement tool. The defendant, if a substantial business
enterprise, would usually have exclusive control of both the expertise and the relevant
facts; it would be difficult indeed, and to no purpose, for the government to have to take
issue with elaborate factual and theoretical arguments concerning who, why and what
went wrong. . . .[W]e see no unfairness in predicating liability on actual non-compliance rather than either intentions or best efforts. . . .Whatever occasional harshness
this could entail is offset by the moderateness of the permited fine, the fact that the
statute's command-to keep refuse out of the public waters--scarcely imposes an impossible burden, and the benefit to society of having an easily defined, enforcible standard
which inspires performance rather than excuses.
Id. at 623 (footnote omitted).
28. Exec. Order No. 11,574, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,627 (Dec. 25, 1970) established a permit system

NOTES AND COMMENTS

petus to enforcement occurred in 1970 when United States Attorneys
29
were given guidelines for criminal and civil enforcement actions.
These guidelines authorized prosecutors to initiate criminal actions
against "occasional polluters" on their own, without approval from the
30
Corps.
The promise of expanded application of the Refuse Act was soon
thwarted, however, by several court decisions. 3' For instance, in Kalur
v. Resor,32 a federal district court enjoined the issuance of discharge
permits under the Refuse Act until the Corps of Engineers amended its
permit regulations to require the preparation of environmental impact
statements in conformance with the National Environmental Policy
Act. 33 This requirement was a substantial barrier to the implementation of the Corps' permit system as a means of dealing with pollution.
Additionally, Kalur held that the Refuse Act permit system did not
34
apply to non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters.
A second decision impairing the Refuse Act as a means of curbing
35
pollution was United States v. PennsylvaniaIndustrialChemical Corp.
In that case, defendant was charged with violating section 13 of the
36
Refuse Act by dumping liquid industrial wastes without a permit.
The Court rejected defendant's contention that its failure to obtain a
permit was excusable because the Corps of Engineers had no formal
permit program at the time of the dumping. 37 However, the Court accepted as an admissible defense the defendant's claim that it had been
"affirmatively misled" by the Corps' longstanding administrative conunder the Refuse Act, as referred to in section 13 of the statute. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). Permits
were to be issued by the Secretary of the Army after consultation with the administrator.
During the years 1971 and 1972, there were about 300 criminal convictions under section 13
of the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970), and over 120 civil actions. 118 CONG. REC. S.33,705
(Oct. 4, 1972) (remarks of Senator Griffin). Most of these resulted in either the stopping of dumping or the installation of pollution controls. Id.
29. Druley, supra note 16, at 6-7.
30. Id See, e.g., United States v. Standard Brands, Inc., No. 70 Cr.858 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
1970). However, the primary enforcement tool utilized under the Refuse Act was the injunction.
Druley, supra note 16, at 8. See, e.g., United States v. Armco Steel Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D.
Tex. 1971).
31. See United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973); Kalur v.
Resor, 335 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1971).
32. 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4327 (1976). The filing of a detailed environmental impact statement
is required under the National Environmental Policy Act when major federal action is anticipated
to have an effect on the environment. Id. § 4332.
34. 335 F. Supp. at 10-11. See Glenn, supra note 9, at 852-53.
35. 411 U.S. 655 (1973).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976); see text accompanying note 19 supra.
37. 411 U.S. at 659. A permit system was instituted in December of 1970. See note 28 supra.
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struction of section 13 as limited to impediments to navigation. 38 The
Court allowed this defense, despite its own and other court decisions
which had interpreted the Refuse Act far more broadly than the Corps'
regulations. 39 The Court stated that the defendant "had a right to look
to the Corps of Engineers' regulations for guidance."''4
The judicial limitations placed upon the Refuse Act in Kalur and
Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical gave impetus to passage of the
FWPCA. With the passage of the FWPCA, the Refuse Act became
limited to curtailing discharges which are of an isolated rather than a
continuous nature and which have an effect upon navigation or
4
anchorage. '
The Federal Water Pollution ControlAct of 1972
The FWPCA of 1972 was an advance over all pre-existing federal
water pollution control legislation. 4 2 The act's stated goal is to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985.43 This
was to be accomplished by the establishment of a permit system requiring polluters to use the "best technology available" to reduce their discharge of pollutants by 1977. 44
Briefly, the act operates as follows: The administrator establishes
45
guidelines to be used in promulgating national effluent limitations.
38. 411 U.S. at 670.
39. Id. at 674. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
40. 411 U.S. at 674.
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (1976). The Refuse Act is expressly preserved by 33 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a)(2)(B) (1976). The Refuse Act permit system was eclipsed by the National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System provided for in 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5). However, the Army Corps
of Engineers still issues permits for dredged or fill material. Id. § 1344. Also, actions pending
under the Refuse Act at the time of passage of the FWPCA were preserved. Id. § 1251. See
United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 500 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,420 U.S. 962 (1975);
United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 354 F. Supp. 173 (N.D.W. Va. 1973).
42. See EPA v. California ex ret. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976);
Arnold, Effuent Limitations andNPDES Federaland State Implementation of the Federal Water
Pollution ControlAmendments of 1972, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 767 (1974).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(l) (1976).
44. That section provides in part:
In order to carry out the objective of this chapter there shall be achieved(I)(A) not later than July I, 1977, effluent limitations for point sources, other
than publicly owned treatment works, (i) which shall require the application of the
best practicable control technology currently available as defined by the Administrator pursuant to section 1314(b) of this title ....
Id. § 1311(b)(l)(A).
However, amendments to the FWPCA in 1977 changed the deadline and the standards to be
applied to discharges. Id. § 131 l(b)(2) (Supp. 1977). The amendments provided that effluent limitations require application of the "best conventional pollutant control technology" by July 1,
1984. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(E).
45. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977), for extensive analysis
of the FWPCA.
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These guidelines describe factors which the EPA must consider in determining permissible levels of discharge. These factors include variables such as the age of the discharging facility and the technological
process being used by that facility. 46 Based upon these and other factors detailed in the guidelines, the adminstrator promulgates national

effluent limitations which establish a range of permissible discharge
levels for classes and categories of point sources. 47 The EPA, or if the
state has an EPA-approved plan, the state, may then issue permits to
individual point sources. 48 These permits entitle the permit holder to
discharge in conformance with levels established by the national effluent limitations. 49 If the operator of a particular point source believes
that he cannot conform to the standards set forth in the national effluent limitations, he may apply to the permit-issuing body for a variance.
If the state, rather than the federal EPA, has authorized a variance, that
50
variance is subject to federal approval.
The focus of the act's enforcement is section 1319. This section
provides that any person who violates compliance orders, the operative
sections of the act, or a permit condition may be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 per day of such violation. 5 1 Civil actions
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) provides in part:
For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations under this Act the Administrator shall, after consultation with appropriate Federal and State agencies and other
interested persons, publish within one year of [enactment of this title], regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations, and, at least annually thereafter, revise.
For the years of struggle to determine how this section interacted with section 1311 and other
sections of the act, see E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); American
Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032
(8th Cir. 1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Although the policies and concepts are a vast improvement over previous legislation, the
FWPCA has been described as a "poorly drafted and astonishingly imprecise statute." E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1026 (4th Cir. 1976), af'd, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
The FWPCA has led to many conflicting interpretations and "virtually every exercise of the
[EPA's] discretion has precipitated protracted litigation." Republic Steel Corp. v. Train, 557 F.2d
91, 94 (6th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded,434 U.S. 1030 (1978).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1976).
48. Section 1342(a)(1) provides that the administrator may:
[I]ssue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section 131 (a) of this title, upon condition that such discharge will meet either
all applicable requirements under sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318 and 1343 of this
title, or prior to the taking of necessary implementing actions relating to all such requirements, such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the
provisions of this chapter.
Id. § 1342(a)(1).
49. For a more detailed discussion of the permit application procedure, see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Marathon Oil Co. v.
EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977).
50. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1976).
51. Section 1319(d) provides:
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may also be brought against municipalities and a state may be joined as
a party.
The act also includes three provisions for criminal liability. One
provides for a maximum $10,000 fine and/or a maximum of six months
in jail for false statements. 52 A second penalizes failure to notify the
government of a harmful spill of oil or hazardous substance with a
maximum $10,000 fine and/or imprisonment up to one year.5 3 The
third, section 1319(c)(1), is a general criminal sanction which provides:
Any person who wilfully or negligently violates section[s] . . . of this
title, or any permit condition or limitation . . . issued . . . by the
Administrator or by a State . . . shall be punished by a fine of not

or by
less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation,
54
imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.
The FWPCA corrects many of the problems confronted when earier legislation was used to remedy water pollution. For example, unlike the Water Pollution Act of 1948, the FWPCA provides for
Any person who violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this
title, or any permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit
issued under section 1342 of this title by the Administrator, or by a State, or in a permit
issued under section 1344 of this title by a State, and any person who violates any order
issued by the Administrator under subsection (a) of this section, shall be subject to a civil
penalty not to exceed $10,000 per day of such violation.
Id. § 1319(d).
52. Section 1319(c)(2) provides:
Any person who knowingly makes any false statement, representation, or certification in any application, record, report, plan, or other document filed or required to be
maintained under this chapter or who falsifies, tampers with, or knowingly renders inaccurate any monitoring device or method required to be maintained under this chapter,
shall upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both.
Id. § 1319(c)(2). See United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
In that case, individual members of a volunteer town board "clearly lacked any personal knowledge of the false statements" made by a city employee to the EPA. Id. at 8. Nevertheless, the
court found the town board criminally liable for those statements under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) on
a theory of respondeat superior. The board was held vicariously liable for the negligent or wilful
statements of its high level employee.
53. Section 1321(b)(5) provides:
Any person in charge of a vessel or of an onshore facility or an offshore facility
shall, as soon as he has knowledge of any discharge of oil or a hazardous substance from
such vessel or facility in violation of paragraph (3) of this subsection, immediately notify
the appropriate agency of the United States Government of such discharge. Any such
person (A) in charge of a vessel from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in
violation of paragraph (3)(i) of this subsection, or (B) in charge of a vessel from which oil
or a hazardous substance is discharged in violation of paragraph (3)(ii) of this subsection
and who is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or (C) in charge of
an onshore facility or an offshore facility, who fails to notify immediately such agency of
such discharge shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for
not more than one year, or both. Notification received pursuant to this paragraph or
information obtained by the exploitation of such notification shall not be used against
any such person in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury or for giving a
false statement.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1976).
54. Id. § 1319(c)(1).
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limitations to be placed upon the sources of pollution regardless of the
quality of the water into which the pollutants were discharged. 55 The
earlier act had permited discharging unless water quality standards
were violated.5 6 Secondly, the FWPCA applies to navigable waters of
the United States, a provision which has been interpreted extremely
broadly, even to the point of including dry gullies. 57 Furthermore, unlike the Refuse Act, the FWPCA permit system and other EPA action
under the act is specifically exempted from the requirement that envi58
ronmental impact statements be filed by the agency.
As for enforcement, the FWPCA scheme depends upon "rapid access" to the federal courts,59 a vast improvement over the lengthy conference procedure of the Water Pollution Act of 1948.60 Also, the
FWPCA civil and criminal enforcement provisions compare favorably
to those in the Refuse Act. 6 1 For example, the Refuse Act provides for
strict liability in both criminal and civil actions and permits a maximum fine of $2,500.62 In contrast, the FWPCA imposes strict liability
only in civil actions, 63 but provides for substantially greater fines than
those in the Refuse Act. 64 Thus, the FWPCA is intended to make polluting an uneconomical proposition. 65 However, unlike the Refuse
55. Id. § 1311(b).
56. Druley, supra note 16, at i.
57. See United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1184-87 (D. Ariz. 1975),
where the court stated that:
For the purposes of this Act to be effectively carried into realistic achievement, the
scope of its control must extend to all pollutants which are discharged into any waterway,
including normally dry arroyos, where any water which might flow therein could reasonably end up in any body of water, to which or in which there is some public interest,
including underground waters.
Id. at 1187 (emphasis in original).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(i) (1976).
59. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 65, reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3668, 3731. See United States v. Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 735, 737 (N.D.
Ohio 1975), where the court stated that "the legislative history of the Acts reveal congressional
concern over the apparent insufficiency of penalties provided to encourage compliance prior to the
1972 amendments."
60. See text accompanying notes 9-15 supra.
61. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976); see text accompanying notes 18-27 and 32-40 supra.
62. 33 U.S.C. § 410 (1976).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1976); see note 51 supra. See, e.g., United States v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 589 F.2d 1305, 1308-10 (7th Cir. 1978), where a fine was assessed against an owner who
was in no way at fault in not learning of an oil spill and in no way caused it.
64. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1976) ($10,000 fine) with 33 U.S.C. § 410 (1976) ($2,500
fine).
65. See United States v. Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 735, 738 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
There the EPA sought to have a fine levied for each violation, rather than on a per day basis. The
court held that "while a $10,000 per violation per day penalty would also tend to effectuate the
congressional enforcement purpose, the truly devastating impact of such a construction on business is not what Congress intended. Such a rule would tend more towards confiscation than mere
deterrence." Id.
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Act, criminal violations under the FWPCA are not based upon strict
liability. 66 The government must show that the violation was either
in both statutes are
negligent or willful. 67 Jail sentences as provided
68
similar-up to one year for first-time offenders.
An additional enforcement provision in the FWPCA not provided
for in earlier legislation is a form of "blacklisting. ' 69 This FWPCA
provision prohibits any federal agency from procuring goods and services from a person convicted of a criminal offense under the act.
ENFORCEMENT ACTION UNDER THE

FWPCA

The above FWPCA enforcement provisions reflect congressional
intent to toughen sanctions against polluters. 70 These provisions rely
primarily upon enforcement of effluent limitations, which are imposed
upon dischargers via permits. 7 ' As long as a discharger remains in
compliance with his permit, he is deemed to be in compliance with the
act. 7 2 A violation of a permit condition subjects a discharger to enforcement provisions. This is also the case where limitations are applicable to a discharge and where the discharger has not obtained a
permit.

73

While this enforcement scheme can be simply stated, it has led to
many questions of statutory interpretation. 74 For one, a number of
cases have arisen where there are no effluent limitations or other regulations which are applicable to the discharge at issue. 75 Courts have
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1976); see text accompanying note 54 supra. The Clean Air Act has
a scienter requirement that the violation be "knowing" before criminal sanctions may be imposed.
Since liability for "knowing" conduct is a tougher test than "negligent" conduct, it would seem
that criminal liability "may be imposed under the Water Act on a lesser showing of culpability
than under the Air Act." Olds, supra note 26, at 15.
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1976); see text accompanying note 54 supra.
68. 33 U.S.C. §§ 410, 1319(c)(1) (1976).
69. Id. § 1368(a). For a discussion of this provision, see Air and Water Act Enforcement
Problems-A Case Study, 34 Bus. LAW. 665, 671 (1979). This statute has been expanded by executive order to require compliance with the act as a condition to an agency contract. Furthermore,
EPA's regulations implementing this order provide that federal, state, or local criminal convictions or administrative findings of non-compliance may serve as a basis for blacklisting a facility.
Id.
70. United States v. Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 735, 737 (N.D. Ohio 1975);
Glenn, supra note 9, at 835-38.
71. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1976). See note 171 infra.
73. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
40 C.F.R. § 124.1 l(a) (1979).
74. See note 46 supra.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 12 E.R.C. 1444 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United
States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp.
665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
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disagreed as to whether enforcement procedures can be instituted
against the discharger in this situation.
A Texas federal district court addressed this question in United
States v. GAF Corp .76 In G4F,defendant chemical company had applied for a permit to dump chemical wastes into a deep well. The gov-

ernment, without taking action on the permit application, sought to
enjoin the dumping under 1319(b), which provides for appropriate civil
relief for violations. 77 The government asserted that the dumping
would violate section 1311 (a). This section provides that, except in
compliance with the act, "the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful. '78 The government maintained that dumping would
violate section 131 (a) per se, regardless of the facts that no applicable
effluent limitations had been established and that defendant's permit
79
had not been acted upon by the EPA.
The GAF court rejected the government's contention that the
broad prohibition in section 131 l(a) could be enforceable where applicable effluent limitations had not been promulgated. 80 The court stated
that enforcement action must be based upon a failure to comply with
promulgated regulations or with other sections of the act that specifically prohibit certain discharges. 8' Furthermore, the court stated that
the government's interpretation of the act would lead to an "intolerable
outcome. ' 82 According to the GAF court, the intolerable outcome of
enforcement of section 1311 (a) per se would be that "every person and
enterprise in the country [would have] to affirmatively comply with one
76. 389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
77. Section 1319(b) provides:
The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil action for appropriate relief,
including a permanent or temporary injunction, for any violation for which he is author-*
ized to issue a compliance order under subsection (a) of this section. Any action under
this subsection may be brought in the district court of the United States for the district in
which the defendant is located or resides or is doing business, and such court shall have
jurisdiction to restrain such violation and to require compliance. Notice of the commencement of such action shall be given immediately to the appropriate State.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1970).
78. Section 1311(a) provides:
Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342,
and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.
Id. § 1311(a).
79. 389 F. Supp. at 1386. See United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 851-53 (7th
Cir. 1977) (steel company's discharge of chemical wastes into deep well properly regulated under
FWPCA); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D) (1976) which gives the administrator the authority to promulgate effluent limitations pertaining to deep wells.
80. The GAF court also denied the injunction on the ground that the disposal of chemical
wastes into a deep well did not constitute a discharge of pollutants within the meaning of section
1311(a). 389 F. Supp. 1383-85.
81. Id. at 1386.
82. Id.
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of the enumerated sections before discharging any pollutant."8 3
Rather than reach this result, the court outlined either of two ways
in which a person could comply with the FWPCA: A person could
never contravene an effluent limitation, or he could comply with the
conditions and limitations of his permit. 84 Apparently piqued that the
government was seeking enforcement where no regulations applied, the
court concluded that the government was trying to "avoid the legal
consequences of the Administrator's dalliance by proposing the per se
interpretation of § 131 l(a)."'85 The court stated that its decision merely
denied to the administrator "the freedom to restructure the FWPCA to
'86
cover what would appear to be his procrastination.
The decision in GAF was relied upon by the Sixth Circuit in Republic Steel Corp. v. Train.87 In Republic Steel, the administrator objected to a permit issued by the Ohio EPA on the ground that the state
agency had improperly waived the July 1, 1977 deadline. That date
was statutorily designated as the date by which the permit-issuing authority should require dischargers to employ the "best practicable control technology currently available. ' 88 The state-issued permit had
allowed Republic to continue discharging at levels above those achievable by the best practicable technology past July 1, 1977.
Republic, possessing a state-issued permit, contended that the state
was entitled to extend compliance with the FWPCA beyond the deadline because, at the time the permit was issued, there were no effluent
limitations defining the "best practicable technology" discharge levels
for Republic's business. 89 The Sixth Circuit held that the inability of
the federal EPA to promulgate timely standards foreclosed the imposi83. Id. at 1385.
84. Id. at 1386. Seealso United States v. Olin Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). In
Olin, defendant corporation and individual defendants sought to dismiss an indictment charging
them with twenty-eight counts of making false statements to the EPA in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1976) and 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1976). See note 52 supra. These charges pertained to
reports which defendant voluntarily filed prior to obtaining a permit to discharge. The defendants
argued that the administrator could have enforced section 1319 even if defendant had not been
issued a permit. Consequently, defendants claimed, the general section 1001 counts should be
dismissed as section 1319(c)(2) preempted application of that statute on the facts before the court.
The court disagreed and interpreted section 1319 as applying "only ... when the Administrator
finds that a violation of a permit condition or of a particular section of the Act has occurred." 465
F. Supp. at 1131.
85. 389 F. Supp. at 1387.
86. Id. Other courts have been less intolerant of delay. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
87. 557 F.2d 91, 95 (6th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 434 U.S. 1030 (1978).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)(A) (1976); see note 44 5upra.
89. 557 F.2d at 95.
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tion of the statutory deadline upon Republic. Citing GAF,90 the court
stated that "federal regulations must exist before dischargers can be
compelled to honor dates for implementing them." 9 1
In another case where there was an absence of EPA regulations,
FordMotor Co. v. EPA ,92 the Sixth Circuit reviewed the administrator's veto of a state-issued permit. There the court set aside an EPA
veto of a state-approved permit on the grounds that the veto was invalid because it "was not based upon any published regulation or guide'93
line or express statutory provision.
The practical effect of the holdings in GAF, Republic Steel, and
Ford is that, unless a discharge is expressly prohibited by EPA regulation or the act, the administrator is powerless to limit water pollution. 94
This result has led to other courts taking a contrary position. 95 These
90. United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975); see text accompanying
notes 76-86 supra.
91. 557 F.2d at 95. While this case was pending, the EPA completed and issued regulations
applicable to defendant's business. Id.
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit's decision was vacated
and remanded for reconsideration in light of the 1977 amendments to the FWPCA. 434 U.S. 1030
(1978). The 1977 amendment which required vacation of Republic specifically gave the administrator discretionary authority to grant an extension beyond the July 1, 1977 deadline. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(a)(5)(B) (Supp. 1977). This amendment allowed the administrator to extend compliance
up to but not later than April 1, 1979 in situations where dischargers were making good faith
efforts to comply.
The Administrator may, if he determines (i) that any person who is a violator of, or
any person who is otherwise not in compliance with, the time requirements under this
chapter or in any permit issued under this chapter, has acted in good faith, and has made
a commitment (in the form of contracts or other securities) of necessary resources to
achieve compliance by the earliest possible date after July 1, 1977, but not later than
April 1, 1979; (ii) that any extension under this provision will not result in the imposition
of any additional controls on any other point or nonpoint source; (iii) that an application
for a permit under section 1342 of this title was filed for such person prior to December
31, 1974; and (iv) that the facilities necessary for compliance with such requirements are
under construction, grant an extension of the date referred to in section 1311 (b)(l)(A) of
this title to a date which will achieve compliance at the earliest time possible but not later
than April 1, 1979.
Id.
92. 567 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1977).
93. Id. at 662. See also Washington v. EPA, 573 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1978). In that case, the
state, under an EPA-approved permit system, issued a permit to a paper company for discharge of
sulphite wastes into the Puget Sound. However, the EPA had not issued applicable effluent limitation guidelines under 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1976), see note 46 supra, for use by the permit issuer. The
EPA challenged the state's authority to issue a permit where the EPA had not established guidelines and attempted to veto the permit under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1976). The court held that "as a
matter of statutory interpretation the Administrator's exercise of the veto power conferred by
section [1342(d)] is contingent upon the antecedent formulation of guideline regulations." 573
F.2d at 589.
94. See Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 567 F.2d 661, 672 (6th Cir. 1977) (Engel, J., dissenting).
95. E.g., American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976); South Carolina Wildlife Fed. v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 124-27 (D.S.C. 1978); United States v. Hudson
Farms, Inc., 12 E.R.C. 1444, 1446 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 668
(M.D. Fla. 1974).
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courts have enforced the broad prohibition in section 1311 (a) that "the

discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful" on aper se
basis. 96 These decisions sometimes enforce section 131 (a) on this basis
with little or no discussion. 97 For example, in United States v. Holland,98 a Florida district court enjoined dumping on the basis of section
131 l(a), referring to that section as the "enforcement hub" of the act.99
Another case which discusses section 1311 (a) is American Frozen Food
Institute v. Train. °° Although not an enforcement case, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted
there that the broad prohibition in section 1311(a) "is central to the
10
entire act [and] is statutory and requires no promulgation." '
In another case, the District of Columbia Circuit again offered
support for a finding that section 1311(a) is enforceable per se. In that
case, NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 0 2 an environmental group challenged EPA regulations which exempted certain agricultural and other discharges from permit requirements. The District
of Columbia Circuit held that these regulations went beyond the EPA's
authority because the "legislative history makes clear that Congress intended [permits] to be the only means by which a discharger. . . may
escape the total prohibition of [section 1311(a)]."' 10 3 Therefore, if the
administrator does not have the power to officially exempt certain discharges by regulations, it follows that the mere absence of regulations
limiting discharges cannot amount to an exemption from enforcement
of the act.
A second question which has confronted the courts when inter96. See note 78 supra.
97. See United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977), a criminal action where the
defendant was seen turning on a gasoline pump which gushed onto a frozen lake. Defendant was
convicted under section 1319(c)(1). See text accompanying note 54 supra. On appeal, defendant
claimed that he had been improperly charged and that he should have been charged with either a
violation of the Refuse Act or section 1321 of the FWPCA which specifically prohibits any discharge of petroleum products. 551 F.2d at 109. In relying only on section 1319(c)(1), the prosecutor was required to show that defendant's alleged actions violated section 1311 (a), which provides
that "[e]xcept as in compliance with [the Act], the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall
be unlawful." 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(a) (1976). The court concluded that the negligent or wilful violation of section 1311 (a) could be the basis of a criminal action. 551 F.2d at 110. The court stated
that this comported with precedent that "water pollution legislation [should] be given a generous
rather than a niggardly construction." Id. at 112, citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384
U.S. 224, 226 (1966); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491 (1960); United
States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1329 (6th Cir. 1974).
98. 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
99. Id. at 668.
100. 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
101. Id. at 128.
102. 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
103. Id. at 1374.
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preting the enforcement mechanism of the act is whether the administrator has a mandatory duty to issue an abatement order to a discharger

in violation of the act. This question centers upon interpretation of
section 1319(a)(3), which provides that whenever the administrator
finds that a person is in violation of section 131 (a) or any permit provisions, conditions, or limitations, the administrator "shall issue an or-

der requiring such person to comply with such section or requirement,
or he shall bring a civil action.' ° 4 The question whether this section
imposes a mandatory duty upon the administrator has arisen in two
contexts. First, if this section does create a mandatory duty, the act
provides that a citizen may bring suit against the administrator to carry
out that duty. 05 Citizens, usually environmental groups, have advocated that the administrator's duty under section 1319(a)(3) is
mandatory and they have sued to enforce that duty.' 06 Second, defendants in criminal prosecutions under the act have defended on the
ground that the administrator must issue an abatement order or take
0 7
civil action before pursuing criminal remedies.1
In the first context, the courts have been divided as to whether a
citizen's civil action may compel the EPA to issue an abatement order
to a violator. 10 8 The only circuit court of appeals to decide this issue,
104. Section 1319(a)(3) provides:
Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Administrator finds
that any person is in violation of section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of
this title, or is in violation of any permit condition or limitation implementing any of
such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by him or by a State or in
a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by a State, he shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with such section or requirement, or he shall bring a civil
action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (1976).
105. Section 1365(a) provides that a citizen may commence a civil action against any person
(including the United States or its agencies) when an effluent limitation or an order issued by an
administrator has been violated. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1976). An action may be commenced
against the administrator if there is "alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or
duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator." Id. § 1365(a)(2).
106. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977); South Carolina Wildlife Fed.
v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978); Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Hoffman, 425 F. Supp. 71
(S.D. Il1. 1977).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Hudson Farms, Inc., 12 E.R.C. 1444 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F.
Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975).
108. Section 1319(a)(3) is also discussed in United States v. Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc., 393 F.
Supp. 735 (N.D. Ohio 1975), in a different setting. There, the administrator issued defendant an
abatement order in March requiring the defendant to comply by May 7. After issuing the order
and prior to May 7, the administrator began a civil action. Defendant claimed that until the
compliance date on the abatement order was passed, he was immune from other enforcement
action. The court held to the contrary, stating:
The language of section 1319(a)(3) does not establish mutually exclusive alternatives;
rather Congress thereby sought to reduce the case load of the courts where administrative action would suffice to effectuate compliance. To rule otherwise, would reward vio-
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the Fifth Circuit, held that the duty of the administrator to issue an
abatement order under section 1319(a)(3) is discretionary rather than
mandatory. 10 9 Two trial courts deciding this question have held that
the act mandates some type of action by the administrator when he
finds that a discharger is in violation of the act."10
In the second context, that of a criminal prosecution, the few reported opinions dealing with this question have held that there is no
mandatory duty for the EPA to issue an abatement order or institute a
civil suit prior to taking criminal action. I ' In United States v. Phelps
Dodge Corp.,"12 defendant was criminally charged with negligently or
wilfully discharging pollutants into a normally dry arroyo in violation
of FWPCA sections 1311(a) 13 and 1319(c)." t4 The defendant sought to
have the charges dismissed on the grounds that the administrator had
failed to issue an abatement order prior to instituting criminal action. 115
In determining whether section 1319(a)(3) 116 imposes prerequisites
to filing a criminal action under section 1319(c), the Arizona district
court in Phelps turned to the act's legislative history. During Senate
consideration of the act, Senator Edmund Muskie, one of the key proponents of the FWPCA, explained that "the provisions requiring the
Administrator to issue an abatement order whenever there is a violation [are] mandatory."" 7 Although this statement lends support to the
argument that there are prerequisites to a criminal suit, the court
looked to other portions of the legislative history which suggested a
contrary conclusion." 8 In the final House committee report, the administrator's enforcement options were described in the alternative.
lators of the Act by forgiving penalties incurred where the administrator has invoked this
congressionally approved procedure, thereby effectively discouraging the utilization of
said procedure.
Id. at 738.
109. Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 1977).
110. E.g., South Carolina Wildlife Fed. v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978); Illinois
exrel. Scott v. Hoffman, 425 F. Supp. 71 (S.D. I11.
1977). However, both of these courts indicated
that the type of enforcement action pursued was discretionary with the administrator. See South
Carolina Wildlife Fed. v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 132-34 (D.S.C. 1978).
Ill. See note 107 supra.
112. 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975).
113. See note 78 supra.
114. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
115. 391 F. Supp. at 1183.
116. See note 104 supra.
117. 391 F. Supp. at 1183, quoting A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 174 [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

118. 391 F. Supp. at 1184.
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The administrator's duties were such that "he may take any of the following enforcement actions: (1) he shall issue an [abatement order]; (2)
he shall notify [the violator] . . . or (3) he shall bring a civil action; or
(4) he shall cause to be instituted criminal proceedings." 19 The Phelps
court interpreted these "conflicting" portions of legislative history to
mean that "while the Administrator must act- in case af [sic] any violation, he has alternative methods of acting; i.e., either by civil or criminal proceedings. He is not required to proceed first to effect a

120
correction by civil means before instituting criminal proceedings."'
UNITED STA TES

v

FREzzo BROTHERS

Facts of the Case
Frezzo Brothers was a family operated business engaged in mush-

room growing and manure composting. Compost was prepared by recycling water from a holding tank through a mixture of hay and
manure.' 2 1 On six different dates, manure-rich water overflowed the
holding tank into a nearby stream. This flowage was traced to the
Frezzo farm by a county health official. Upon investigation, a company officer admitted that the holding tank could control the water
119. H. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1972). That House report states:
Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Administrator finds
that anyone is in violation of [the Act] he may take any of the following enforcement
actions: (1) he shall issue an order requiring compliance; (2) he shall notify the person in
alleged violation. . . . [If the state does not commence action within 30 days after notification,] the Administrator shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with a
permit or a condition or limitation of a permit; or (3) he shall bring a civil action; or (4)
he shall cause to be instituted criminal proceedings.
Id., reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 117, at 801-02 (emphasis added).
120. 391 F. Supp. at 1184. Accord, United States v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 12 E.R.C. 1444 (E.D.
Pa. 1978). In Hudson Farms,a Pennsylvania district court relied on Phelps in denying a motion to
dismiss an indictment based on the administrator's admitted failure to issue an abatement order
prior to criminal prosecution. The court denied the motion, stating that:
[Section 1319(c)] makes no mention of a prerequisite of Administrator action. This
implies a congressional intent not to impose such a prerequisite.
In short, although the question is, indeed, a close one, under all the existing law it
would appear that defendant's motion should be denied.
Counsel for defense have cited no controlling authority to counter this conclusion
and what little authority that exists tends to support it.
Id. at 1448.
However, the Hudson Farms court noted that certain dicta to the contrary existed: "Whenever a violation of the FWPCA is directed to the attention of the Administrator, he is directed
either to issue an abatement order, which is ultimately enforceable by a criminal prosecution, or to
institute a civil suit for enforcement." Id. at 1445, quoting Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Hoffman, 425 F.
Supp. 71, 77 (S.D. Ill. 1977).
121. Tons of horse manure are routinely purchased as the main ingredient for the compost.
The defendants made more income from selling compost to other mushroom growers than they
did from selling mushrooms. Telephone interview with Bruce Chasan, Assistant United States
Attorney, Eastern District of Pennsylvania (April 7, 1980).
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"only 95 percent of the time."' 122
On the basis of this information and lab analysis of samples of the
discharges, the company and two of its officers were indicted on six
counts of negligently or wilfully discharging a pollutant into a waterway in violation of section 1311(a) 123 and 13 19(c) 124 of the FWPCA.
Four counts of wilful violations rested upon measurements of discharge
on days when their was no rain. Two counts of negligent violations
rested upon evidence gathered on rainy days. Defendants had never
applied for a permit. Prior to indictment, defendants had not been issued an abatement order nor had any civil action been taken against
them. Furthermore, the EPA had not promulgated any effluent limitations or other regulations applicable to compost manufacturing.
Defendants' motion to dismiss was denied and a jury convicted
defendants on all counts. 125 Prior to sentencing, motions for judgment
of acquittal were denied. 126 The individual defendants were each sentenced to thirty-day jail terms and fined an aggregate of $50,000. The
corporate defendant was also fined $50,000. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the convic27
tion.'
Reasoning of the Court
In reviewing the conviction of the Frezzo defendants, the Third
Circuit was faced with two main issues: first, whether the EPA may
proceed under the act against a discharger although it has not promulgated applicable effluent limitations, 28 and second, whether the EPA
must give notice of the alleged violation or institute civil action before
commencing criminal prosecution. 29 The Third Circuit was the first
circuit court of appeals to consider these issues in a criminal prosecution.
In determining whether the administrator was required to give notice, issue an abatement order, or take civil action before pursuing
criminal remedies under section 1319(c), the court first examined the
wording of that criminal provision. There the statute provides that wil122. United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W.
3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980).
123. See note 78 supra.
124. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
125. United States v. Frezzo Bros., 461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
126. Id.
127. United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979).
128. Id. at 1127-28.
129. Id. at 1125-27.
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ful or negligent violators of the act "shall" be punished by imprisonment, fine, or both. 30 The court also considered the wording of section
1319(a)(3), which provides that violators "shall" be served an abatement order or civil action "shall" be brought against them.1 31 The defendants argued that without section 1319(a)(3) notification prior to
the institution of criminal proceedings that they were in violation of the
act, there could not be a showing that their actions were wilful violations of the act. 132 In determining the effect, if any, of section
133 re1319(a)(3) upon section 1319(c), the court, drawing from Phes,'
lied on the final House committee report. There the enforcement actions that the administrator "may" take were described in the
alternative, and included a range of notices, civil actions, or criminal
34
proceedings.
The court considered this committee report to have greater weight
than a subsequent statement by Senator Muskie that an abatement order or civil action was mandatory under the act.' 35 The court stated
that the Senate had acceded to the House in not imposing mandatory
prerequisites to enforcement. 36 Further, the court stated:
[W]e see no reason why the Government should be hampered by
prerequisites to seeking criminal sanctions under the Act ....
[In
view of the broad responsibilities imposed upon the Administrator
.. . he should be entitled to exercise his sound discretion as to
whether the facts of a particular case warrant civil or criminal sanctions. 137
Moreover, the court stated that this holding was consistent with the
desire of Congress to strengthen the ability of the government to pursue
criminal remedies for water pollution. 38 A contrary holding, the court
stated, "would be inconsistent with the Congress' desire for a stronger
139
enforcement mechanism."'
On the second issue facing the court, whether the promulgation of
effluent limitations was a prerequisite to enforcement action, the defendants argued that before a violation of section 1311 (a) could occur,
130. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
131. See note 104 supra.
132. 602 F.2d at 1126.
133. See text accompanying notes 112-20 supra.
134. 602 F.2d at 1126; see note 119 supra and accompanying text.
135. 602 F.2d at 1126.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1126-27 (footnotes omitted).
138. Id See also United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 113 (6th Cir. 1977), where the court
stated that "Congress intended a more severe penalty [than that available in the Refuse Act] in the
event that the discharge was deliberate and wilful."
139. 602 F.2d at 1126.
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defendants must have been shown to have not complied with an existing effluent limitation. They contended, relying chiefly on GAF, that
applicable limitations were a prerequisite to enforcement.'1°
The government countered that GAF was incorrectly decided. It
argued that section 1311(a) was by itself an enforceable prohibition
upon all discharges of pollutants. In attempting to rebut the holding in
GAF that such a proposition would be intolerably burdensome, the
government outlined the correct procedure as follows: Where no effluent limitations have been established for a particular business, a discharger should apply for a permit to discharge pollutants under section
1342(a), which allows the administrator to establish interim operating
conditions pending permit approval.' 4 1 If this procedure were not
adopted by the court, the government argued, the absence of effluent
limitations would nullify the act.
In weighing these arguments, the Frezzo court looked to the policies of the act. The court found that the basic policy of the act was to
"halt uncontrolled" discharges. 142 The court could see nothing in the
act which restricted enforcement efforts to situations where effluent limitations had been promulgated. 14 3 The court held that even where no
such regulations had been promulgated, violations could be punished.
Without this flexibility, the court stated, "numerous industries not yet
considered as serious threats to the environment may escape administrative, civil, or criminal sanctions merely because the EPA has not established effluent limitations.' 144 Further, these unregulated industries
would be able to continue polluting until the administrative process
was able to fix effluent limitations. Such a result, the court held,
"would be inconsistent with the policy of the Act."' 45
The Frezzo court, unlike the court in GAF, did not find enforcement prior to the establishment of applicable regulations to be "unduly
burdensome."'' 46 The court suggested that a business, prior to discharging pollutants, should apply for a permit regardless of whether
applicable effluent limitations had been promulgated. This procedure
would prompt the administrator to consider promulgation of perma140. Id. at 1127. See text accompanying notes 76-86 supra.
141. 602 F.2d at 1127. See the text of 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1976) supra note 48. That
section provides that the administrator may impose such conditions as "are necessary to carry out"
the provisions of the act.
142. 602 F.2d at 1128.
143. Id. Thus, section 1311 (a) could be enforced per se "even though no effluent limitations
have been promulgated for the particular business charged with pollution." Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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nent effluent limitations applying to the entire industry. The court added that, in appropriate cases, the permit applicant would be protected
47
from liability during the pendency of the permit application.
In contrast to this procedure, the court stated, the interpretation of
the act urged by the defendants would have allowed them to continue
polluting until effluent limitations for the entire composting business
were promulgated. The court rejected this interpretation, stating:
"[The] EPA cannot be expected to have anticipated every form of water
pollution through the establishment of effluent limitations. . . . [In this
case] the government's intervention by way of criminal indictments
brought to a halt potentially serious damage to the stream in ques148
tion."
ANALYSIS

Prosecution of defendants in Frezzo resulted in jail sentences for
individuals who were pursuing a legal business, albeit in violation of
the FWPCA. 4 9 In this respect, Frezzo is unusual because although
criminal enforcement has been available against polluters for about
fifteen years under the Refuse Act 150 and for seven years under the
FWPCA,15 1 criminal prosecution has not been widely employed and
jail sentences rarely have been imposed. 152 The Frezzo holdings, which
eliminate regulations and notice as prerequisites to criminal prosecution, will likely smooth the way for further criminal proceedings.1 53
These holdings will best achieve the sweeping goal of the act: to elimi147. Id See text accompanying notes 169-82 infra.
148. Id.
149. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
150. Although criminal enforcement has been available under the Refuse Act since its inception, the statute was not applied to pollution until the Republic Steel and StandardOil cases. See
text accompanying notes 21-27 supra.
151. See text accompanying notes 42-54 supra.
152. See United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1974). Several factors have
retarded the use of criminal sanctions. The most basic factor is that violators of pollution laws
have not been generally regarded as criminals. Comment, The Use of Civil Penalties in Enforcing
the Clean WaterAct Amendments of1977, 12 SAN FRAN. L. REV. 437, 444 (1978). This perception
makes it less likely that enforcers will choose to indict rather than warn or enjoin and it makes
juries less willing to convict. Id. See Glenn, supra note 9, at 835-37. Further inhibiting criminal
prosecution is that many polluters are corporations. While corporations are easier to sue than
individuals, obviously they cannot be imprisoned and hence a criminal prosecution is only minimally more stigmatizing than civil actions. Furthermore, culpable individuals within the corporation may be difficult to locate. In any case, criminal proceedings usually require a showing of
scienter which is not an element in civil actions. Finally, criminal prosecutions entail more constitutional protections for defendants than civil actions. Olds, supra note 26, at 13.
153. Two similar criminal actions have been filed in the same federal district of Pennsylvania.
United States v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 12 E.R.C. 1444 (E.D. Pa. 1978), discussed in note 120 supra;
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nate pollution by 1985.154 They are in harmony with the proposition
that in the FWPCA, the "Congress. . . made a legislative determination that polluters rather than the public should bear the costs of water
pollution."' 155 Seen in this light, the Frezzo decision interprets the
FWPCA logically and correctly.
On the issue of whether effluent limitations are a prerequisite to
enforcement, the Frezzo holding is correct because of the result to
which a contrary holding would lead. As an example of a contrary
result, the GAF court punished the public by permitting continued pollution because the promulgation of effluent limitations was overlooked
or delayed. 156 This reasoning ignores the fact that some of the delays
involved in the promulgation of effluent limitations have been justified
by "technological and administrative restraints."'' 57 These delays were
apparently foreseen by Congress since permits may be issued prior to
the promulgation of effluent limitations. 5 8 The act provides that, prior
to the promulgation of effluent limitations under section 131 (a), the
state or the EPA may impose such "terms and conditions in each permit as [the Administrator] determines are necessary to carry out the
provisions of the Act." 159 Thus, administrative delays in the promulgation of regulations need not lead to the continued pollution by a dis60
charger who is immune from enforcement procedures.
Another factor supporting the Frezzo interpretation is that the
United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc., No. 79-211 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1979).
For a discussion of Oxford Royal, see 10 ENV. REP. 2005 (Feb. 15, 1980) and id. 2095 (Mar. 7,
1980). In Oxford Royal, the individual and corporate defendants pleaded guilty. A plea bargain
agreement was reached where the corporation was fined $100,000 and the corporate president was
fined $100,000 and sentenced to probation for five years. Id. at 2095.
154. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
155. United States v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 589 F.2d 1305, 1309 (7th Cir. 1978).
156. See text accompanying notes 81-86 supra.
157. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1378-79 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
158. Id.
159. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1976). See note 48 supra.
160. See also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135-36 (1976), where the
Court held that even though Congress may have intended effluent limitations to be promulgated
within one year of passage of the act, the administrator's interpretation of the act allowing for later
promulgation would be accepted. In construing the FWPCA as the administrator suggested, the
Court quoted an earlier decision where the Court also accepted the administrator's construction:
We therefore conclude that the Agency's interpretation . . . was "correct," to the
extent that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular interpretation of a
complex statute such as this is the "correct" one. Given this conclusion, as well as the
facts that the Agency is charged with administration of the Act, and that there has undoubtedly been reliance upon its interpretation by the States and other parties affected
by the Act, we have no doubt whatever that its construction was sufficiently reasonable
to preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency.
Id. at 134-35, quoting Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975).
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FWPCA provides that until December 31, 1974, a timely permit applicant was entitled to complete immunity from enforcement action. 16'
Thus, the FWPCA did not demand immediate cessation of discharge
upon passage of the act as the only means of compliance with section
1311(a). Rather, the legislative scheme was to gradually impose increasingly strict discharge limitations upon permit holders. Under the
Frezzo interpretation, section 1311 (a) acts as a stopgap provision where
dischargers have not come under the umbrella of the permit system.
Nevertheless, the contrary interpretation finds support in a
number of cases. 162 Among those cases is Stream Pollution Control
Board v. United States Steel Corp.,163 relied upon by the Frezzo defendants. 64 In that case, the Seventh Circuit states in dictum that an
enforceable section 1311 (a)perse ban on discharges where there are no
regulations would be contrary to the entire legislative scheme. 6 5 Such
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1976). For text of the statute, see note 171 infra. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1975), where the court stated:
The timetable for permit issuance is set forth in section [1342(k)]. For the first 180
days after the enactment of the statute, the discharge of any pollutant shall not be a
violation of the Act if the discharger applies for a permit within the 180 day period.
Until December 31, 1974, the pendency of an application for a permit containing the
necessary information for processing of the application will prevent a polluter from being in violation of the permit requirement. After December 31, 1974, the Act contemplates that all discharges from point sources shall be made in conformity with a permit.
The permits may be issued by the states under approved programs or by the Administrator in the absence of a state program. The Act vests the Administrator with the final
review authority for permits issued by the states.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
162. See notes 76-93 supra and accompanying text.
163. 512 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1975).
164. Brief for Appellant at 12.
165. 512 F.2d at 1042. In Stream Pollution ControlBoard,a private citizen sought to intervene
in a common law public nuisance action brought by a state agency against United States Steel
Corporation. No federal effluent limitations had been promulgated at the time the common law
action was brought. Furthermore, United States Steel's permit application was pending with the
EPA at the time of the suit. Id. at 1041 n.12.
The court recognized that under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(B) (1976) a private citizen may intervene if the action was brought to require compliance with a "standard, limitation, or order" within
the meaning of the act. 1d. at 1041. In order to bring the action within the scope of the statute,
petitioner argued that defendant was in violation of section 1311 of the act. The private citizen
argued that there could be a violation regardless of whether effluent limitations had been promulgated. The court rejected this argument, stating:
We think defendant is in compliance with the statute as long as it does not violate any of
its provisions. Since its discharges cannot violate any effluent standards or limitation
until after such a standard has become effective, defendant's earlier discharges are not
prohibited by the Act; defendant is therefore in compliance with the statute.
Id. at 1042.
Although this case was relied upon in Frezzo by the defendant, Brief for Appellant at 12, the
government did not consider Stream Pollution Control Board as inconsistent with its own position.
Brief for Appellee at 4. The government noted that, in Steam Pollution Control Board,the discharges in question occurred before the section 1311 (b) effective date of July 1, 1973. Also, defendant there was presumed to have made timely application for a permit, unlike the defendants
in Frezzo. Id. at 4-5.
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a result, the court stated, would mean that discharges would be totally
prohibited until an effluent limitation was promulgated. Thus, the effluent limitation would act as a license to pollute. If this interpretation
were followed, the court stated, passage of the act would demand "total
purity. . . forthwith only to be succeeded by various stages of impu66
rity."1
However, the Seventh Circuit later found its interpretation in
Steam Pollution Control Board not to be controlling. 167 Total purity
need not be required forthwith because, as the court noted in the later
case, permits could be issued regardless of the nonexistence of applica68
ble regulations.
Although the Frezzo holding on the issue of effluent limitations is
correct, the court's opinion does not sufficiently analyze the problem of
what criteria should govern whether today's first-time permit applicant
should be given immunity during the pendency of a permit application.
According to the Frezzo decision, a "potential transgressor"' 69 of the
act has an affirmative obligation to apply for a discharge permit regardless of the existence or absence of effluent limitations. The court stated
that in appropriate circumstances application for a permit could protect
an applicant from suit during the pendency of the application. 70 As
authority for this proposition, the court cited section 1342(k) 17 1 of the
FWPCA and Stream Pollution Control Board. 72 However, in reality,
the permit applicant is protected from suit only to the extent of the

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

512 F.2d at 1042-43.
United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 844.
602 F.2d at 1128.
Id.
Section 1342(k) provides:
Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed compliance, for purposes of sections 1319 and 1365 of this title, with sections 1311, 1312, 1316,
1317, and 1343 of this title, except any standard imposed under section 1317 of this title
for a toxic pollutant injurious to human health. Until December 31, 1974, in any case
where a permit for discharge had been applied for pursuant to this section, but final
administrative disposition of such application has not been made, such discharge shall
not be a violation of (1)section 1311, 1316, or 1342 of this title, or (2) section 407 of this
title, unless the Administrator or other plaintiff proves that final administrative disposition of such application has not been made because of the failure of the applicant to
furnish information reasonably required or requested in order to process the application.
For the 180-day period beginning on October 18, 1972, in the case of any point source
discharging any pollutant or combination of pollutants immediately prior to such date
which source is not subject to section 407 of this title, the discharge by such source shall
not be a violation of this chapter if such a source applies for a permit for discharge
pursuant to this section within such 180-day period.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1976).
172. 512 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1975); see notes 163-66 supra and accompanying text.
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administrator's grace. 173 Neither of the authorities relied upon by the
Frezzo court would have protected defendants even if they had had a
permit pending. Section 1342(k) would not have offered protection because that section provides that a permit applicant is shielded from enforcement action during the pendency of the application until
December 31, 1974.174
Stream Pollution Control Board does not offer protection because

the facts in that case concerned a permit application prior to December
31, 1974.175 Neither Stream Pollution Control Board nor section
1342(k) considers the question of liability where a permit was applied
for after December 31, 1974. Consequently, it is unlikely that either of
these authorities, relied upon in Frezzo, provides assurance that a dis-

charger who applies for a permit today will be shielded from liability
during the pendency of the application. Therefore, the Frezzo interpretation appears to leave to the administrator's discretion whether a par76
ticular application is surrounded by the "appropriate" circumstances
meriting immunity from suit during permit pendency. If the circumstances were not appropriate for immunity, the administrator could re177
fuse to establish temporary operating conditions and/or bring suit.
Either of these actions could lead to the shut down of the applicant's
business. 7 1 Furthermore, even if the EPA were to refrain from enforcement action, a polluter would remain liable to a civil action
brought by a private citizen. 79 However, these possibilities do not refute the correctness of the Frezzo holding to the effect that effluent limitations are not a prerequisite to enforcement. 80 Occasional harsh
173. Consider section 558 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which offers some support that
applicants should be given immunity during pendency. 5 U.S.C. § 558 (1976). That section provides that where a licensee has made timely and sufficient application for a new license, a license
with reference to an activity of a continuing nature does not expire until the application has been
finally determined. However, this provision applies to renewals, not first-time applicants.
174. See note 171 supra.
175. See 512 F.2d at 1038 n.2.
176. 602 F.2d at 1128.
177. Cf Marathon Oil v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1977) (Wallace, J., dissenting),
where the majority found that due process requirements were met by EPA procedures. Id. at
1265. In dissent, Judge Wallace stated that "the EPA's refusal to issue the necessary permit would
require petitioners to cease operations. . . . I cannot agree that the EPA has the power to force
the termination of an ongoing business by means of a procedure that does not meet due process
standards." Id. at 1275-76.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1273; Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 660 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 975, (1976), where the court stated that "[wihile a citizen must give the EPA advance notice
of his intention to sue, there is no authorization to block a citizen's suit under section [ 1365] even
though the agency believes that the suit should not go forward." Id See note 105 supra.
180. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975
(1976), relied upon by the district court in Frezzo. 461 F. Supp. at 269. In Bethlehem Steel, the
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results such as those described above were foreseen by the drafters of
the legislation. 181 Amelioration of the impact of the FWPCA lies with
82
Congress, not with the courts.1
The other defense raised by the defendants in Frezzo, that section
1319(a)(3) imposes a mandatory duty upon the administrator to issue
an abatement order prior to seeking criminal remedies, was also correctly decided by the Frezzo court. If an abatement order were required as a prerequisite to criminal prosecution, it would not limit civil
liability, but it would impose a nearly insurmountable impediment to
criminal enforcement. For example, assume that as a prerequisite to
criminal action the administrator had issued an abatement order which
required the defendants in Frezzo to comply with the act in thirty days.
Despite that order, the defendants would still be civilly liable for all
pollution discharges prior to issuance of the order as well as those
which continued while the abatement order was in effect.183 This follows because the only event that cuts off civil liability is a cessation of
illegal discharges. 84 Therefore, the issuance of an abatement order
still would have left the defendants in Frezzo open to enforcement action. However, criminal action would be foreclosed no matter how
wilfully or negligently dischargers continued to pollute up to the time
of the compliance date. Such an interpretation of the act would make
criminal provisions useless appendages. This would contradict the
plain congressional intent that the FWPCA strengthen criminal enforcement as compared to that available in earlier legislation. 185 Furthermore, if there were such a prerequisite to criminal action, it would
impose upon the EPA an additional administrative procedure. This
court held that the EPA was without authority to grant an extension beyond a statutory compliance date even though by that date the administrator had not yet promulgated applicable regulations. 544 F.2d at 663.
181. See id. at 662-63, where the court stated that Congress had "opted to take" the risk that
"harsh consequences could ensue" under environmental statutes. See also Union Electric Co. v.
EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 269 (1976) (Clean Air Act).
182. 544 F.2d at 663.
183. See United States v. Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 735, 736 (N.D. Ohio 1975);
note 108 supra.
184. 393 F. Supp. at 736.
185. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65, reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS. 3668, 3730-31, where the committee report stated:
Under the Refuse Act the Federal government is not constrained in any way from
acting against violators. The Committee continues that authority in this Act.
The Committee further recognizes that sanctions under existing law have not been
sufficient to encourage compliance with the provisions of Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Therefore, the Committee proposes to increase significantly the penalties for
knowing violations would [sic] be subject to penalty of $25,000 per day or imprisonment
for one year or both.
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conflicts with the stated policy of the act which provides that unneces186
sary delays and paperwork should be avoided.
Another factor supporting the Frezzo court's interpretation of the
act that there be no 1319(a)(3) prerequisite to criminal prosecution is
that the Senate version of the FWPCA was specifically amended by the
House so that the administrator was "authorized rather than required"
to initiate civil actions. 87 This accession to the House by the Senate
88
was correctly noted and relied upon by the court.
The Frezzo decision that neither effluent limitations nor notice of a
violation is a prerequisite to criminal suit streamlines enforcement.
The impact of this resolution is that a discharger is expected to know
that he is in violation of the act, despite the absence of applicable regulations spelling out permissible conduct. Considering the specific facts
involved in the Frezzo case, this does not seem like an overly harsh
result. In Frezzo, defendants knew of and did nothing to prevent the
89
spillage of thousands of gallons of feces-laden water into a stream.
As fecal matter is probably the oldest water pollutant known to man,
the finding of criminal liability in Frezzo does not seem unjust. 90 If a
186. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1976).
187. CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 132, reprintedin [1972] CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3776, 3809.
188. See text accompanying note 136 supra.
189. See Brief for Appellee at ix-xvi. At trial, the discharged wastes were described as having
a "very characteristic dark brown color. They are malodorous. They smell like manure. And
sometimes their consistency var[ies] from that of watery to nearly sludge-like." Id. at ix.
190. The defendants in Frezzo raised another defense in a petition to the Third Circuit for a
rehearing after the court's opinion was handed down. The defense raised there was that the defendants were exempt from the permit program because the discharges for which they had been
convicted were the result of exempt agricultural activities. This claim of exemption rested upon 40
C.F.R. 125.4(i) (1978), which provides:
The following do not require an NPDES Permit:
(i) Water pollution from agricultural and silvicultural activities, including runoff from
orchards, cultivated crops, pastures, rangelands, and forest lands, except that this exclusion shall not apply to the following:
(3) Discharges from agricultural point sources as defined in § 125.53.
Section 125.53, defining agricultural activities, provides:
(a) Definitions. For the purpose of this section:
(1) The term "agricultural point source" means any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance from which any irrigation return flow is discharged into navigable waters.
(a) The term "irrigation return flow" means surface water, other than navigable waters,
containing pollutants which result from the controlled appliction of water by any person
to land used primarily for crops, forage growth, or nursery operations.
40 C.F.R. 125.53 (1979). The 1977 amendments to the FWPCA include a section which appears
to have drawn from code regulation section 124.4(i):
The Administrator shall not require a permit under this section for discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture, nor shall the Administrator
directly or indirectly, require any State to require such a permit.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(I) (Supp. 1977). Although neither the above statute nor section 124.4(i) have
been the subject of judicial interpretation, an antecedent regulation was invalidated on the
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situation were to arise where a defendant could not have been expected
to know that he was polluting, there likely would not be a finding of
criminal liability because the violation would not have been "wilful or
negligent" and hence would not satisfy the scienter requirements of
section 1319(c). 19 1
CONCLUSION

Enforcement of section 131 (a) of the FWPCA on a per se basis
places upon polluters the burden to apply for a permit to determine
whether they come within the scope of the act. After Frezzo, failure to
meet this affirmative duty may lead to criminal penalties in the first
instance. This does not seem an unfair burden to place upon dischargers considering that the act has been law for eight years. Moreover, the
date by which all discharge of pollutants is to cease is less than five
years away. If the FWPCA is to be a potent weapon with which to end
water pollution, polluters not in compliance with the act should be subjected to the full force of the penalties provided therein. Cases such as
Frezzo prepare the way for imposition of these penalties.
SHARON NELSON KAHN

grounds that the EPA lacked authority to exempt agricultural point sources from the permit requirement. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see 40
C.F.R. 125.4 (1975) (invalidated).
The Third Circuit in Frezzo denied without comment the defendants' petition for rehearing.
The agricultural exemption issue was raised again on petition for certiorari, which was also denied. 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980). On March 14, 1980, defendants filed a motion to
vacate and set aside the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) or, alternatively, for a writ of
error coram nobis. This motion was pending at the time of publication of this article.
191. See text accompanying note 54 supra.

